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ABSTRACT: These days people keep wondering whether the world is more dangerous now than
it was before. Do natural disasters really happen more frequently or is it just that the damage
they cause that has become greater? The situation is not quite clear. As a result of the globalizing
world and advanced communication infrastructure, the number of known / reported catastrophes is
relatively high, but that does not necessarily mean there has been an actual increase in frequency.
The red mud spill in Hungary was a special combination of industrial and natural disasters. This is
one of the reasons why it is very hard to pinpoint who is responsible for the event. Natural disasters
tend to raise questions about responsibility that are different from those concerning industrial
catastrophes. Interestingly enough, however, nature often plays an important role in industrial
disasters. The present article is concerned with how the issues of responsibility are handled in the
case of industrial disasters.
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INTRODUCTION

Tom Massey, director of RWE Power, admitted
in reply to a question that “Fifteen years ago,
companies were saying that climate change was
not relevant to business. You could not measure it,
companies had no individual responsibility for it

fundamentally changed this scenario.”
Yet this is just the usual way in
environmental protection. The carcinogenicity of
asbestos had long been proven by science when
large building material producers still insisted that
slates and asbestos-cement pipes were harmless. It
also took a long time to convince economic actors
that halogenated hydrocarbons damage the ozone
layer and to achieve limitation or prohibition of their
production and use.
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Figure 1: Historical overview of accidents
The front page of the world-renowned
economics periodical The Economist has hardly
featured anything but climate-change-related news
for the last couple of years. Still, I am rather certain
that it is not these articles but rather extreme weather
events (like the 2005 Hurricane Katrina that killed
more than 1800 people and flooded the city of New
Orleans) that will call the attention of the public to
the potentially disastrous impacts of climate change.
The tsunami following the Great Sumatra-Andaman
earthquake which killed 225,000 people has had a
more significant effect on humanity than all the UN
development summits that have been held for years.
These phenomena made the public realize that, in

Image 1: Aznalcollar (Spain). Failure of tailings
dam retaining wall, 25 April, 1998.
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spite of all our ingenuity, humanity does not “rule
over” nature. It took more than 225,000 lives to make
us consider that all we have “achieved” so far is to
create a weapons stockpile which, even in case of
an accidental misunderstanding, is powerful enough
to destroy the entire Earth. We do not, however,
have anything to protect us from drought-triggered
famines, or AIDS, and even less from earthquakes,
the latter of which we cannot even forecast. Even
the most sophisticated models fail at coping with
nature’s “inventiveness.”
We are surrounded by natural and industrial
disasters. The threat is growing continuously despite
humanity’s enormous efforts to avoid risks. The
figure below makes it obvious that even though
international efforts have increased in number,
industrial disasters have not become any less
frequent. The waves stirred by Hungary’s 2010 red
mud catastrophe have not even settled yet, and still
we are already in the middle of a nuclear crisis at
Japan’s tsunami-stricken power plant.
Risk, by definition, is the product of two factors,
the amount of damage expected to be done by an event that
threatens people’s lives and valuables and the probability
of that event occurring. Given the continuous growth in
the population of the Earth (and in the wealth it possesses),
environmental risks are obviously increasing as well, no
matter whether disasters are becoming more frequent or not.

Image 2:Kolontar (Hungary). Failure of the ‘red
mud’ dam retaining wall, 12 October, 2010. .
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Figure 2. Columns show the numbers of victims in millions, while the dashed line represents the number of
reported events. (“Guha-Sapir D, Vos F, Below R, with Ponserre S. Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2010:
The Numbers and Trends. Brussels: CRED; 2011. p.3. http://www.cred.be/sites/default/files/ADSR_2010.pdf.)
Still, the answer to the popular question whether
today’s world is more dangerous or not is rather
unclear. Have natural disasters really become more
common, or is it just the damage done that has
grown? There is no definite answer. As a result of
a globalizing world and advanced communication
infrastructure, the number of known / reported
catastrophes is relatively high but that does not
necessarily mean there has been an actual increase
in their frequency. The total number of victims also
is not above the average of many years.
Considering per capita damage, the picture
is even more confusing. The population of the
Earth continues to grow exponentially, thus the
denominator also grows rapidly. Yet while the
number and severity of disasters is fluctuating,
there is no clearly visible upward trend. This would
suggest a drop in relative risk. The increase in risk,

consequently, is instead caused by rapid growth in
accumulated wealth, which also is responsible for the
increasing value of insured damage (see figure 3).
Even conservative professionals have no doubt
that the risks related to climate change have actually
increased. Among other phenomena, floods are often
associated with climate change and are apparently
becoming more and more common in Europe as well.
As evidenced by the two tables below, European
statistics about the frequency of and the damage caused
by floods do not fully support the former assumption
though floods have indeed become more frequent,
both the numbers of people affected and the amount of
damage caused has fallen during the last ten years. The
improvement indicated by these figures is, of course,
a consequence of efficient flood control measures. As
we can see, appropriate protection might offset or even
reduce the growth in risk induced by accumulation of
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Figure 3: Changes in Economic Losses (green columns) and Insured Damage (blue columns), 1950 to
2000. (Source: Munich Re: 2000 http://www.munichre-foundation.org/NR/rdonlyres/E7ED6B1D2D9F-4E64-9FB3-5C8A4539AD9B/0/20051116_Hoeppe_Hohenkammer_short_WEB.pdf)

Number of
floods
Number of
countries
affected
Number of
people killed

1980-2009
239

2000-2009
147

22

19

1309

511

Number of
people affected
(millions)

3.0

1.3

Economic losses
(billion USD)

92.3

45.0

Table 1: Floods and their Impacts (total) in
European Countries. Source: EM-DAT The OFDA/
CRED International Disaster Database
wealth.
Nevertheless, the costs of protective
measures are very high. Rich European countries
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already have appropriate flood protection systems
in place, yet efforts still continue. In economically
underdeveloped regions like Bangladesh, floods still
cause incredible devastation. The 1970 storm took
more than half a million lives; the storm in 1991
killed “only” 138,000, while the 2007 flood caused
1,042 deaths. Although flood control protection
systems are being built in these regions, too, the
poor are more severely hit by natural disasters.
Some storms and floods can at least be forecast in
advance. There are, however, natural disasters that
cannot be predicted, and there is no suitable way of
ensuring protection against them. Earthquakes or
tsunamis will follow some of them.
II.

COMBINATIONS OF NATURAL
AND INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS

The red mud spill in Hungary was a special
combination of an industrial and a natural disaster.
This is one of the reasons it is difficult to pinpoint
who is responsible for the event. Natural disasters
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Countries
Romania
France
Greece
Italy
UK
Bulgaria
Austria
Hungary
Czech Republic
Germany

Number of floods
25
14
14
13
12
11
8
6
6
6

Number of people Number of people
killed
affected
169
1187,400
34
22,500
15
12,200
72
20,000
26
379,500
52
13,300
1
45,800
14
61,400
38
218,800
29
331,600

Economic losses
(billion USD)
1.7
1.6
0.7
2.1
16.6
0.5
0.2
3.8
3.1
14.1

Table 2: European Countries most Severely Hit by Floods (2000-2009) Source: EM-DAT The OFDA/
CRED International Disaster Database
tend to raise questions about responsibility that are
different from those of an industrial catastrophe.
Interestingly, however, nature often plays an
important role in industrial disasters. Extreme
weather played a role in both the Exxon Valdez
incident and the accident in the Gulf of Mexico. The
role of exceptional weather conditions—rainfall
amounting to ten times the average and a severe
windstorm—was also mentioned in connection with
the accident in Hungary. Yet do extreme rains and
winds, as extraordinary natural phenomena, relieve
corporate managers from their responsibilities or
limit their extent thereof? How should the important
principles of environmental protection, such as the
“principle of due diligence” or the “precautionary
principle,” be interpreted in the context of industrial
disasters or activities associated with high ecological risks?
The Harvard case study treated the Exxon
Valdez incident as a human resource issue. According
to the study written by the world’s leading business
school, the problem was that the tanker’s captain
was an alcoholic. Leaving the crew and the cargo to
be transported by an alcoholic was no doubt an HR
mistake as well.
It is surprising, however, that the case study

did not mention the continuous environmental
catastrophe many huge oil tankers had been causing.
They regularly pumped sea water into their tanks
on the way back from port and then pumped the
oil-contaminated water back into the sea near the
oil port. No one intended to call to account the
owners for this “slow catastrophe.” Also, the case
study never mentioned that the size of the tankers
represented an unjustifiable magnitude of risk. Those
enormous tankers were only built to economize on
oil transportation costs. Accordingly, fuel became
a bit cheaper in the US, while corporations’ profits
grew still larger. Whether the saving of a few cents
per liter is worth the increased risk of a potential
environmental disaster has, “naturally enough,”
never been investigated.
Morelli (1999) argue that business
and industry are preparing for dramatic shift in
responsibility. Recent decades have showed that trust
has become a fundamental issue for both governments
and economic actors. According to Eurobarometer
surveys, politicians and corporate managers are
no longer trusted by European citizens and neither
are scientists. One could make the rather cynical
argument that the public does not greatly trust NGOs
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either, even though the public establishes them.
It was an apparent sign of mistrust that,
besides Hungarian green organizations, two
international NGOs – Greenpeace and Robin des Bois
from France – also decided to have an on-the-ground
presence at the site of the red mud catastrophe.
Based on the work of respectable scientists
and a number of studies, a significant number
of Hungarian institutions concluded that neither
drinking water sources nor the soil were endangered
by the spilt material; nevertheless the two NGOs
flooded the media with statements claiming quite
the opposite.
“Robin des Bois can not really give credence
to the statements of those Hungarian professors
and scientists who claim that there is no risk of
radioactivity, nor of heavy metal migration into the
deep soil layers” (36). This is despite the fact that
they only sent two experts to the affected area who
reported that “The area flooded by the red mud spill
in Hungary directly affects the lives of some 8,500
inhabitants. Only to mention a couple of examples:
approximately 70 tons of arsenic, 70 t lead, 130 t
nickel, 650 t chromium, 700 t vanadium, 1 600 t
sulfur and 114 000 tons of aluminum were released
into nature. Arsenic, nickel and chromium 6 have
carcinogenic effects” (3).
And: “On 4 October 2010, at 1:30pm, the
western wall of one of a chain of red mud reservoirs
operated by Magyar Alumínium ZRt—MAL
collapsed, freeing about 600 to 1,000 thousand
cubic meters of red mud, a waste product of the
bauxite refining process” (4).
I did not actually check whether these
numbers are correct, but they do sound rather
frightening. What I do know, however, is that
those elements were not added to the mud during
the process, but they were there originally, and
their concentration could have doubled at most,
and even then only if the bauxite had been of very
good quality. (In this case sodium hydroxide would
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have dissolved at almost half of the bauxite ore—
only the aluminum oxide part—thereby increasing
the concentration of various other elements in the
remaining mud.). Of course, that does not make
those elements “free” either, as they are present in
the mud in the form of insoluble compounds.
A long citation such as the following may not
be exactly appropriate, yet in this very case, it might
be worth knowing what the “official” statement (not
really read by anyone outside Hungary) reports:
“Based on the independent examinations of
the National Institute of Environmental Health and the
experts of HAS, there are no significant amounts of metal
contaminants in the red sludge and the concentrations
of toxic metals do not exceed the standard limits in the
soil, but the pH measured from an aqueous extract of the
industrial waste is 11.8, which indicates a strong base.
According to the analysis of the samples taken by the
Institute of Materials and Environmental Chemistry of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on October 5th,
the red sludge contained cadmium, chrome, mercury,
nickel, lead and zinc in concentrations smaller (in some
cases considerably smaller) than the values allowed for
waste mud. The arsenic content of the samples taken
from the area of Kolontár and analyzed by the Institute
of Materials and Environmental Chemistry was also
less than the values allowed. The laboratory analysis of
the soil samples taken on October 8, 2010 conducted by
HAS’Research Institute for Soil Science and Agricultural
Chemistry has shown that heavy metals from the red
sludge did not reach deeper than 10 centimeters into the
soil, and even there their level did not exceed the values
permitted for contaminants. Based on these results, it is
safe to conclude that the deeper layers of the soil and the
first water-table are not in immediate danger.
Based on laboratory analyses, the Office
of the Chief Medical Officer has issued a statement
to the effect that the red sludge waste matter is
dangerous to human health, living organisms, and
the environment because of its highly basic effect.
Experts of the National Service for Radiation Health
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Emergency Preparedness examined the radiation
levels of the affected area, mainly in Kolontár and
Devecser. The spilled red sludge is not radioactive.
The so-called activity-concentration of the samples
gathered is close to natural values of soil, so it is safe
to say that they do not pose health risks. According
to the official statement of the National Service for
Radiation Health Emergency Preparedness, the red
sludge does not pose any health risk for those living
in the area as far as radioactivity is concerned.
After the analysis of the samples taken
according to strict regulations, The University
of Pannonia and the National Public Health and
Medical Officer Service announced that the amount
of airborne dust in the affected areas has not exceeded
the levels allowed since October 17, and the level
of air pollution has decreased in every settlement
examined. In order to continuously monitor the level
of airborne dust in the affected areas, the National
Service for Public Health and the Middle-DanubeValley Inspectorate for Environmental Protection,
Nature Conservation and Water Management have
been operating an integrated monitoring system
since October 11.
There is on-going quality control of
drinking water in the area stricken by the disaster.
Water can be safely consumed over the whole area.
The Middle Transdanubian Regional Institute
of the National Public Health and Medical
Officer Service has conducted more than 120
examinations so far to monitor the quality of water,
and all results are negative.” (http://mta.hu/
mta_hirei/osszefoglalo-a-vorosiszap-katasztrofaelharitasarol-a-karmentesitesrol-es-a-hosszu-tavuteendokrol-125859/)
An international NGO, some easyto-deceive Hungarians might think surely the
government wants to do us some good. It is no
wonder that society’s trust has faded, a finding which
is worsened by news broadcasts that reveal serious
defects in our institutions, indicating, for example,

that we could not even pinpoint the authorities
responsible for licensing or operational supervision.
“In its ruling, the Budapest Court of Appeal
named the Middle-Danube-Valley Inspectorate for
Environmental Protection, Nature Conservation
and Water Management as the building control and
construction supervisory authority responsible for
the Ajka mud reservoirs,” reported daily newspaper
Népszabadság. This recent final ruling put an end
to the legal debate whether it was the local notary
or the environmental authority that should have
inspected the condition of the walls of the ruptured
reservoir. In its decision, the court concluded that
the red mud reservoir and similar facilities “had
required and still require special licensing and
operational regulations which can not be handled
in standard building control proceedings.” Thus the
Ajka alumina plant falls under the scope of authority
of the environmental inspectorate. Following the
red mud catastrophe, Secretary for Environmental
Affairs, Zoltán Illés, declared that it was not the
authority under the supervision of his own office
but rather the local notary who acted as a building
control authority in the case of the reservoirs. After
the accident, the regional environmental inspectorate
and the Public Administration Office of Veszprém
County ordered several building control proceedings
to be conducted by the notary of Devecser, who,
however, declined to do so “for lack of authority.”
(http://greenprofit.hu/forum/viewtopic.
php?f=34&p=28048)
The debate, of course, is still ongoing.
Interestingly, society has begun to pay more
attention to the role of authorities and other
political aspects, while limiting the responsibility
of the company operating the reservoirs to the
question of material compensation, just as good
taxpayers do. The “big” questions turn out to
be,Who issued the permits and who supervised
the operation of the reservoirs? In this case, the
question of responsibility is a multi-faceted one.

Contradictions Inherent in the Management of Natural and Industrial Disasters... 45

Concerning the responsibility of the local notary
or the mayor, one might ask why there were
people living near the dam and how and why their
permits had been issued, or, if they did not have
the necessary permits, why was it not ensured that
they were prohibited from actually living there?
It is hard to imagine, however, how a local notary
could be responsible for the building permits for
the reservoir itself. Having some knowledge about
how environmental authorities operate, we know
that they also do not have the necessary expertise.
The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Future Generations suggested that the Hungarian
Office for Mining and Geology might be the
competent authority. Although we know this now,
it was not all that clear up until now. Had we known
the competent authority, could we have avoided
the disaster? Probably not. Supposedly, satellite
measurements might be able to detect whether the
soil is moving and how fast. If it is actually moving,
this could lead to the failure of the dam. Who should
conduct such examinations, the authorities or the
company operating the reservoir? Both of them, I
guess, but the “principle of due diligence” would
rather assign that responsibility to the operating
party, especially as the authorities, under the
“precautionary principle,” hardly have a chance
to know all the potential risks, technologies, and
sources of human error. The operating company
has the necessary means for that, and they, too,
earn the profit and not (or just very indirectly)
authority employees.
Risk theory distinguishes between fair
and unfair risks. A risk is considered fair if the
accidental and material damage of the hazardous
activity is borne by the same “person” who enjoys
its benefits. This is, of course, merely rational (or
maybe even emotional) reasoning. Most likely,
legislation could never deal in practice with such
concepts. International experience and practice,
which may serve as a starting point in finding a
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solution, do, nevertheless, exist in this field.
III.

INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS AND
HOW THEY ARE TREATED

Recently, the number of cases where managers have been
subjected to criminal trial because of their companies’
environmentally harmful activities has been growing,
primarily in Canada and the US. This is theoretically
possible under Hungarian legislation as well. Managers
usually react defensively to actual legal practice. First,
professional reactions tend to emphasize the need for
adjustments in legal practice and for providing improved
personal protection to managers.
Corporate managers, apparently, consider
complex, bureaucratic, and overdocumented
environmental management systems (typically
developed by external consultants) to be the best
method of defense in civil law proceedings, though
it is quite obvious from American examples that this
is not a sure-fire method of defense.
The environmental risk of any activity is
inherently uncertain, even theoretically. Wynne
makes a convincing point about this with respect to
hazardous waste materials, “Scientific uncertainty is
rather high about what is going on inside a waste
dump site in chemical, physical and biological terms,
while opportunities for examining and reducing this
uncertainty are very limited. Therefore we can only
make approximations about the impact a dumpsite
has on the surrounding area, as the effects are
always dependent on how the dumpsite is operated.
The conditions under which waste is transferred to
a dumpsite and which site it is transferred to is also
a function of a number of unknown social factors”
(Wynne).
Considering Wynne’s thoughts, one might
conclude that corporate managers practice the
“art of the impossible” concerning environmental
management. Yet we should not forget that the lack
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of a theoretical solution does not necessarily imply
that there is no practical solution. Concerning the
avoidance of environmental risks, scientific accuracy
is not a requirement but on the contrary responsible
conduct is (usually defined as due diligence in legal
terms) (Bartman).
For practical purposes, the environmental
risks of any business activity can be analyzed
along two dimensions. One of them, in our opinion,
is a function of the materials, technologies, and
human resources used, since these are the factors
determining the company’s inputs and outputs and
also the frequency and the course of breakdowns.
This dimension contains everything that depends on
the internal systems of the company.
The other dimension is the company’s
perception of the ever-changing outside world. We
consider this dimension as including the company’s
geographical location, the ecological characteristics
of the surroundings, biodiversity, prevailing winds in
addition to demographics (population density, age,
and income distribution), and other characteristics
such as the existing infrastructure (roads,
telecommunication networks, and the presence
of hazard intervention systems), the population’s
educational
level,
environmental
attitudes,
employment levels, and political institutions.
Obviously, both dimensions are rather
complex, but making a distinction is important
as both corporate managers and regulators tend
to devote serious attention to the first dimension
(environmental risks pertaining to the company’s
internal matters), while the effects on risk of all the
external factors have an inclination to be forgotten
by both directors and the authorities. Typically, it is
only after a major catastrophe that they realize the
existence of these phenomena.
There are many examples that demonstrate
the significance of these two dimensions. In Hungary,
for instance, a number of chemical factories have
found themselves enclosed by ever-expanding

cities. Previously, while still located in the outskirts,
not even a factory with serious pollution potential
had caused a problem, as any pollution releases
were diluted before reaching the more densely
populated city areas. Later, however, the situation
changed. Today, even a company strictly adhering
to all pro-environmental requirements might have
environment-related conflicts and issues.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Informing local citizens and preparing them for
damage containment is at least as important to the
future of the company as reducing the probability
of occurrence. In the case of a potential accident,
it is critical whether or not local inhabitants and
disaster response organizations are prepared to
reduce the adverse consequences of any accidents.
Both the Bhopal and the Chernobyl disasters, and
even this recent red mud catastrophe in Hungary,
would have claimed far fewer lives if the authorities
and inhabitants had been prepared for the possible
occurrence of such an emergency.
We believe that companies should not limit
their theoretical and practical environmental risk
prevention efforts to their own premises but also
should have to take into account the constantly
changing natural and social environment. Corporate
environmental management, thus, must not be
limited to within the company’s own four walls.
What we can learn from the red-mud
accident in Hungary and from Bhopal and other
above mentioned cases, that corporations very
often prepared for accidents but even more often
they are insured against them. Managers are ready
to make any efforts which reduces their personal
responsibility. They are often employing external
experts preferable very highly respected ones, they
are ready to pay for an expensive insurance and they
are ready to cooperate with different authorities. All
this will not protect them fully against the accidents.
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Any company has to meet with the strickest
environmental and risk regulation and should have
a good environmental performance record, and
keep good communications with people living in
the surrounding. But they have to understand, that
the good communication and the implemented
environmental management system, the experts and
the advisers even the „working permission” issued
by different legal authorities, can not protect them
against their moral responsibility for the society and
for the local community. Those who are directly
gaining the benefit (profit) from an operation, they
are and they should be the real experts, so they
should take the full responsibility for it, even in a
case of natural disaster or terrorist action against
them. The moral responsibility of corporate leaders
can not be shared with external actors.

48

Journal of Environmental Sustainability – Volume 1

V.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

WORKS CITED
Bartman, Thomas R.(1993): Dodging
Bullets FORTNIGHTLY, October 1, 1993,
21-22.
EM-DAT The OFDA/CRED International
Disaster Database
Jackson, Tim(1993): Clean Production
Strategies. Lewis Publishers, 1993, 73-74.
(http://greenprofit.hu/forum/viewtopic.
php?f=34&p=28048
(http://mta.hu/mta_hirei/osszefoglaloa-vorosiszap-katasztrofa-elharitasarola-karmentesitesrol-es-a-hosszu-tavuteendokrol-125859/)
Guha-Sapir D, Vos F, Below R, with
Ponserre S. (2010)Annual Disaster
Statistical Review 2010: The Numbers and
Trends. Brussels: CRED; 2011.” ThisThis
document is available on http://www.cred.
be/sites/default/files/ADSR_2010.pdf.
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology
of Disasters (CRED) Université catholique
de Louvain – Brussels, Belgium
Hoeppe, Peter. Worldwide Natural
Disasters – Effects and Trends http://
w w w. m u n i c h r e - f o u n d a t i o n . o rg / N R /
rdonlyres/E7ED6B1D-2D9F-4E64-9FB35C8A4539AD9B/0/20051116_Hoeppe_
Hohenkammer_short_WEB.pdf
Kerekes, Sándor, Vastag, Gyula, Rondinelli,
Dennis A.: Evaluation of Corporate
Environmental Management Strategies: A
Framework and Application International
Journal of Production Economics, vol. 13,
nos. 2-3 (August 1996): 193-211

[11]

[12]

Matthias and Steger, Ulrich (1998)
Managing Outside Pressure, Strategies for
Preventing Corporate Disasters John Wiley
& Sons Chichester, New York etc.
Wynne, B. (1993) “Uncertainty and
Environmental
Learning-reconceiving
science and policy in the preventive
paradigm.” In Clean Production Strategies,
edited by T. Jackson, 63-84. Boca Raton,
Florida: Lewis Publishers, 1993.

Morelli John (1999) Voluntary Environmental
Management: The Inevitable Future, Crc Press

Nithart, Charlotte, Bossard, Christine:
(2010) A vörösiszap katasztrófa(The
red-mud chatastrophe) Robin des Bois.
Magyarország, 2010. december pp. 46.
ROBIN DES BOIS Association de protection
de l’Homme et de l’environnement 14, rue
de l’Atlas 75019 Paris – France Tel.: 331 48
04 09 36 / Fax: 33 1 48 04 56 41 contact@
robindesbois.org

Contradictions Inherent in the Management of Natural and Industrial Disasters... 49

